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Abstract— The compact size and high wavelength-selectivity of 
microring resonators (MRs) enable photonic networks-on-chip 
(PNoCs) to utilize dense-wavelength-division-multiplexing 
(DWDM) in their photonic waveguides, and as a result, attain high 
bandwidth on-chip data transfers. Unfortunately, a Hardware 
Trojan in a PNoC can manipulate the electrical driving circuit of 
its MRs to cause the MRs to snoop data from the neighboring 
wavelength channels in a shared photonic waveguide, which 
introduces a serious security threat. This paper presents a 
framework that utilizes process variation-based authentication 
signatures along with architecture-level enhancements to protect 
against data-snooping Hardware Trojans during unicast as well as 
multicast transfers in PNoCs. Evaluation results indicate that our 
framework can improve hardware security across various PNoC 
architectures with minimal overheads of up to 14.2% in average 
latency and of up to 14.6% in energy-delay-product (EDP). 
 
Index Terms—Photonic Networks-on-Chip, Process Variations, 
Hardware Trojan, Data Snooping, Security, Data Encryption 
I. INTRODUCTION 
O cope with the growing performance demands of modern 
Big Data and cloud computing applications, the complexity 
of hardware in modern chip-multiprocessors (CMPs) has 
increased steadily. To reduce the hardware design time of these 
complex CMPs, third-party hardware IPs (3PIP) are frequently 
used. Typically, a 3PIP vendor provides a soft IP for the CMP 
design, which is then sent to a foundry for fabrication. An 
adversary in the utilized electronic design automation (EDA) 
tool provider can modify the synthesized mask data and the 
resultant hardware implementation of the soft IP during 
fabrication, which can introduce security risks [1] [2]. For 
instance, the presence of Hardware Trojans (HTs) in the final 
hardware implementation can lead to leakage of sensitive 
information from modern CMPs [3]. Thus, security researchers 
that have traditionally focused on software-level security are 
now increasingly interested in overcoming hardware-level 
security risks. 
Many CMPs today use electrical networks-on-chip (ENoCs) 
for inter-core communication. ENoCs use packet-switched 
network fabrics and routers to transfer data between on-chip 
components [4]. Recent developments in silicon photonics have 
enabled the integration of photonic components and 
interconnects with CMOS circuits on a chip. Photonic NoCs 
(PNoCs) provide several prolific advantages over their metallic 
counterparts (i.e., ENoCs), including the ability to 
communicate at near light speed, larger bandwidth density, and 
lower dynamic power dissipation [5]. These advantages 
motivate the use of PNoCs for inter-core communication in 
modern CMPs [6]. 
Several PNoC architectures have been proposed to date (e.g., 
[7], [9]). These architectures employ on-chip photonic links, 
each of which connects two or more gateway interfaces. A 
gateway interface (GI) connects the PNoC to a cluster of 
processing cores. Each photonic link comprises one or more 
photonic waveguides and each waveguide can support a large 
number of dense-wavelength-division-multiplexed (DWDM) 
wavelengths. A wavelength serves as a data signal carrier. 
Typically, multiple data signals are generated at a source GI in 
the electrical domain (as sequences of logical 1 and 0 voltage 
levels) which are modulated onto the multiple DWDM carrier 
wavelengths simultaneously, using a bank of modulator MRs at 
the source GI [10]. The data-modulated carrier wavelengths 
traverse a link to a destination GI, where an array of detector 
MRs filter them and drop them on photodetectors to regenerate 
electrical data signals. 
In most architectures, each GI in a PNoC is able to send and 
receive data in the optical domain on multiple (often all) utilized 
carrier wavelengths [9]. Therefore, each GI has a bank of 
modulator MRs (i.e., modulator bank) and a bank of detector 
MRs (i.e., detector bank). Each MR in a bank resonates with 
and operates on a specific carrier wavelength. In this manner, 
the excellent wavelength selectivity of MRs and DWDM 
capability of waveguides are utilized to enable high bandwidth 
parallel data transfers in PNoCs.  
 Similar to CMPs with ENoCs, the CMPs with PNoCs are 
expected to use several 3PIPs, and therefore, are vulnerable to 
security risks [11]. For instance, if the entire PNoC used within 
a CMP is a 3PIP, then a hardware implementation of this PNoC 
in a potentially malicious foundry can have HTs introduced 
within the control units of the PNoC’s GIs. These HTs can 
snoop on packets in the network. These packets can be 
transferred to a malicious core (a core running a malicious 
application) in the CMP to extract sensitive information. 
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 Unfortunately, MRs are especially susceptible to security 
threatening manipulations from HTs. In particular, the MR 
tuning circuits that are essential for supporting data 
broadcasts/multicasts and to counteract MR resonance shifts 
due to process variations (PV) make it easy for HTs to retune 
MRs and initiate snooping attacks. To enable data 
broadcast/multicast in PNoCs, the tuning circuits of detector 
MRs partially detune them from their resonance wavelengths 
[8], [12]-[13] (described in more detail in Section 3), such that 
a significant portion of the photonic signal energy in the data-
carrying wavelengths continues to propagate in the waveguide 
to be absorbed in the subsequent detector MRs. On the other 
hand, process variations (PV) cause resonance wavelength 
shifts in MRs [14]. Techniques to counteract PV-induced 
resonance shifts in MRs involve retuning the resonance 
wavelengths by using carrier injection/depletion or thermal 
tuning [6], implemented through MR tuning circuits. An HT in 
the GI can manipulate the abovementioned tuning circuits of 
detector MRs to partially tune the detector MR to a passing 
wavelength in the waveguide, which enables snooping of the 
data that is modulated on the passing wavelength. Such covert 
data snooping is a serious security risk in PNoCs. 
In this work, we present a framework that protects data from 
snooping attacks and improves hardware security in PNoC 
architectures. Our framework has low overhead and is easily 
implementable in any existing DWDM-based PNoC 
architecture without major changes to the architecture. Our 
novel contributions are: 
 
1) We analyze security risks in photonic devices and extend 
this analysis to the link level, to determine the impact of 
these risks on PNoC architectures; 
2) We propose a circuit-level scheme called Privy Data 
Encipherment Scheme (PDES), which integrates two 
strategies to protect data from snooping HTs: (i) 
exploitation of MRs’ PV profiles to generate unclonable 
signatures/keys for data encryption, and (ii) privy 
incorporation of communication metadata in the data 
encryption-decryption mechanism to protect the identity of 
utilized encryption keys;  
3) We propose an architecture-level Reservation-Assisted 
Metadata Protection Scheme (RAMPS) that conceals the 
communication metadata from snooping HTs to further 
enhance data security in DWDM-based PNoCs; 
4) We combine these circuit-level and architecture-level 
schemes (PDES and RAMPS) into a holistic framework 
called SOTERIA; and analyze it on the Firefly [8], 
SwiftNoC [35], and LumiNoC [13] PNoC architectures. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several prior works, e.g., [11], [16], [17], [36]-[41] discuss 
the presence of security threats in ENoCs and have proposed 
solutions to mitigate them. In [11], a three-layer security system 
approach was presented by using data scrambling, packet 
certification, and node obfuscation to enable protection against 
data snooping attacks. A symmetric-key based cryptography 
design was presented in [16] for securing the NoC. In [17], a 
framework was presented to use permanent keys and temporary 
session keys for NoC transfers between secure and non-secure 
cores. Three different mechanisms to protect hybrid circuit-
packet switched ENoC routers from timing channel attacks 
were presented in [36]. In [37], a detailed security analysis 
related to planned obsolescence of TSV-based 3D NoCs was 
presented. A non-interference based adaptive routing scheme to 
secure NoCs from side channel and Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attacks was proposed in [38]. In [39], a packet validation 
technique was proposed to protect compromised network-on-
chip (NoC) architectures from fault injection side channel 
attacks and covert HT communications. A security enhanced 
NoC was proposed in [40], which is able to identify traffic 
anomalies and handle distributed timing attacks. In [41], a self-
contained Network-on-Chip (NoC) firewall at the network 
interface (NI) layer was presented, which, by checking the 
physical address against a set of rules, rejects untrusted CPU 
requests to the on-chip memory, and thereby protects all 
legitimate processes running in a multicore SoC. All of these 
prior works focus on security enhancement in ENoCs, but none 
of them has analyzed security risks in photonic devices and 
links; or considered the impact of these risks on PNoCs. 
Fabrication-induced PV impact the cross-section, i.e., width 
and height, of photonic devices, such as MRs and waveguides. 
In MRs, PV causes resonance wavelength drifts, which can also 
be caused due to thermal variations (TV) [58]. These PV+TV 
induced resonance drifts in MRs can be counteracted by using 
device-level techniques such as thermal tuning or current 
injection tuning [6]. Current injection tuning can induce blue 
shifts in the resonance wavelengths of MRs using carrier 
injection into MRs, whereas thermal tuning can induce red 
shifts in MR resonances through heating of MRs using 
integrated heaters. To remedy PV, the use of device-level tuning 
techniques is inevitable; but their use also enables partial 
detuning of MRs that can be used to snoop data from a shared 
photonic waveguide. Prior works, such as [57], propose link-
level techniques to address the PV issue. In [57], the 
assignments of MRs to carrier wavelengths are rearranged to 
minimize the power consumption of compensating the PV 
induced resonance shifts. In addition, prior works [18], [19], 
[29] discuss the impact of PV-remedial techniques on crosstalk 
noise and propose techniques to mitigate it. The impact of PV-
remedial techniques on crosstalk was quantified in [18]. In [19], 
an encoding mechanism based on the PV-profile of MRs was 
proposed to mitigate crosstalk noise caused by PV-remedial 
techniques. A double MR based crosstalk mitigation strategy 
was proposed in [29] to reduce crosstalk noise. However, none 
of these prior works analyzes the impact of PV-remedial 
techniques on hardware security in PNoCs.  
Our proposed framework in this paper enables security 
against snooping attacks during not only unicast 
communications but also multicast communications in PNoCs. 
Our framework is network agnostic, mitigates PV, and has 
minimal overhead, while improving security for any DWDM-
based PNoC architecture. 
III. HARDWARE SECURITY CONCERNS IN PNOCS 
A. Threat Model 
Modern chip-multiprocessor (CMP) designs often 
incorporate intellectual properties (IPs) (e.g., reusable units of 
logic, functionality, or layout) from third party providers. Use 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
3 
of such third-party IPs (3PIPs) reduces the complexity and time 
required for putting together soft CMP IPs (e.g., RTL level 
source codes), which are then synthesized into fabrication mask 
data using EDA tools and PDKs. These synthesized mask data 
are then sent to the external foundry for fabrication. The 
common practice of employing third party EDA tools for 
synthesis and foundries for fabrication partially relinquishes the 
designers’ control over the final CMP hardware 
implementations. As a result, it becomes possible for an 
adversary in the EDA tool provider to implant Hardware 
Trojans (HTs) into the synthesized mask data and final CMP 
hardware implementations. These HTs are very small malicious 
alterations in complex IPs that are activated only under certain 
conditions to introduce security threats such as Denial of 
Service (DoS) and Data Snooping.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Schematic of a compromised PNoC with its processing cores running 
malicious programs and gateway interfaces (GIs) infected by Hardware Trojans 
(HTs). 
 
Unfortunately, PNoCs are also expected to incorporate the 
use of 3PIPs and fabrication through third party foundry in their 
hardware design cycle, which exposes them to security threats 
related to HTs. Fig. 1 shows the schematic layout of a typical 
PNoC, in which the gateway interfaces (GIs) are connected 
with each other through photonic waveguides in a serpentine 
topology. As mentioned earlier, a GI connects a cluster of cores 
(e.g., four cores here) to the PNoC, and each GI has at least one 
bank of modulators to enable photonic data transmission and at 
least one bank of detectors to enable photonic data reception. 
Each of these modulators and detectors employs control circuits 
to enable its active operation and redressal from PV induced 
resonance shifts (further discussed in section III.B). An 
adversary in the foundry can introduce HTs in these control 
circuits. It can also partner with software providers to introduce 
malicious application programs to be run on the final CMP 
hardware. As shown in Fig. 1, there can be HTs in the control 
circuits of multiple GIs, as well as instances of malicious 
programs simultaneously running on multiple cores. These HT-
infected GIs can partner with malicious program instances to 
create security threats in the PNoC.  
B. Device-Level Security Concerns 
Process variation (PV) induced undesirable changes in MR 
widths and heights cause “shifts” in MR resonance 
wavelengths, which prevents accurate modulation (at the 
source) or filtering for detection (at the receiver) with MRs. 
This shift can be remedied by using current injection tuning and 
thermal tuning. The current injection tuning method injects (or 
depletes) free carriers into (or from) the Si core of an MR using 
the electrical tuning circuit, which reduces (or increases) the 
MR’s refractive index owing to the electro-optic effect, thereby 
remedying the PV-induced red (or blue) shift in the MR’s 
resonance wavelength. In contrast, a practical way of using 
thermal tuning for remedying PV induced resonance shifts is to 
produce blue-shift fabrication bias in MRs so that the resonance 
wavelengths of the MRs at fabrication are smaller than (towards 
the blue end of the spectrum from) their desired operating 
wavelengths [48]. Doing so automatically converts any PV 
induced red or blue shift in an MR resonance into a net blue-
shift, given that a large enough blue-shift fabrication bias is 
applied to the MR to begin with [48]. This net blue-shift then 
can be compensated for by heating up the MR to a 
corresponding higher temperature using the integrated micro-
heater, which can be controlled using a similar electrical tuning 
circuit. Current injection tuning can provide a tuning range of 
only 1.5nm at most [42], but it incurs relatively low latency and 
power overheads [43]. In contrast, thermal tuning incurs high 
latency and power overheads, but it can provide a larger tuning 
range of about 6.6nm [43]. Moreover, thermal tuning can cause 
“thermal crosstalk” to change the temperature of adjacent 
channel waveguides, causing them to operate under a 
temperature gradient, and reducing the reliability of light 
coupling between the waveguide and MRs. Therefore, although 
the use of either current injection tuning or thermal tuning is 
theoretically sufficient for remedying the PV induced resonance 
shifts, we envision a tuning mechanism as described in [43] that 
can combine the benefits of both these techniques by 
intelligently using the least power consuming technique from 
current injection tuning and thermal tuning to lock the MR 
resonance with the nearest available carrier wavelength either 
towards the blue end or the red end of the spectrum. Using the 
tuning mechanism from [43], the resonance of no MR in the 
PNoC needs to be tuned for more than half the channel gap. In 
addition, the electro-optic effect (i.e., carrier injection/ 
depletion) produced by the same electrical tuning circuit as used 
for current injection tuning is typically used to enable 
modulator MRs to move in and out of resonance (i.e., switch 
ON/OFF) with the utilized carrier wavelengths for signal 
modulation [7].  An HT can manipulate these electrical tuning 
circuits that are used for PV remedy (current injection tuning + 
thermal tuning) and signal modulation, which may lead to 
malicious operation of modulator or detector MRs, as discussed 
next. 
 
(a)             (b) 
Fig. 2: Data transfer in a DWDM-based photonic waveguide, with (a) a 
malicious modulator MR leading to data corruption, and (b) a malicious 
detector MR leading to data snooping. 
  
Fig. 2(a) shows the malicious operation of a modulator MR. 
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A malicious modulator MR is partially tuned to a data-carrying 
wavelength (shown in purple) that is passing by in the 
waveguide. The malicious modulator MR draws some power 
from the data-carrying wavelength, which can ultimately lead 
to data corruption as optical ‘1’s in the data can lose significant 
power to be altered into ‘0’s. Moreover, a malicious modulator 
MR can also cause denial of data communication by fully 
tuning to a data-carrying wavelength and completely drawing 
all its power from the waveguide (not shown in Fig. 2). 
Alternatively, a malicious detector (Fig. 2(b)) can be partially 
tuned to a passing data-carrying wavelength, to filter only a 
small amount of its power and drop it on a photodetector for 
data duplication. This small amount of filtered power does not 
alter the data in the waveguide so that it continues to travel to 
its target detector for legitimate communication [12]. Further, a 
malicious detector MR can also cause data corruption (by 
partially tuning to a wavelength) and denial of communication 
(by fully tuning to a wavelength). Thus, both malicious 
modulator and detector MRs can corrupt data (which can be 
detected and corrected) or cause Denial of Service (DoS) type 
of security attacks. In addition, malicious detector MRs can also 
snoop data from the waveguide without altering it. Such covert 
snooping attacks present a security threat in photonic links. 
C. Link-Level Security Concerns 
Typically, a photonic link is comprised of one or more 
DWDM-based photonic waveguides. A DWDM-based 
photonic waveguide uses a modulator bank (a series of 
modulator MRs) at the source GI and a detector bank (a series 
of detector MRs) at the destination GI. DWDM-based 
waveguides can be broadly classified into four types: single-
writer-single-reader (SWSR), single-writer-multiple-reader 
(SWMR), multiple-writer-single-reader (MWSR), and 
multiple-writer-multiple-reader (MWMR). As SWSR, SWMR, 
and MWSR waveguides are subsets of an MWMR waveguide 
we restrict our link-level analysis to MWMR waveguides only. 
An MWMR waveguide typically passes through multiple 
GIs, connecting the modulator banks of some GIs to the 
detector banks of the remaining GIs. Thus, in an MWMR 
waveguide, multiple GIs (referred to as source GIs) can send 
data using their modulator banks and multiple GIs (referred to 
as destination GIs) can receive (read) data using their detector 
banks. Fig. 3 presents an example MWMR waveguide with two 
source GIs and two destination GIs. Fig. 3(a) and 3(b), 
respectively, present data corruption by a malicious source GI 
and data snooping by a malicious destination GI, on this 
MWMR waveguide. In Fig. 3(a), the modulator bank of source 
GI S1 is sending data to the detector bank of destination GI D2. 
When source GI S2, which is in the communication path, 
becomes malicious with an HT in its control logic, it can 
manipulate its modular bank to modify the existing ‘1’s in the 
data to ‘0’s. This ultimately leads to data corruption. For 
example, in Fig. 3(a), S1 is supposed to send ‘0110’ to D2, but 
because of data corruption by malicious GI S2, ‘0010’ is 
received by D2. 
Let us consider another scenario for the same data 
communication path (i.e., from S1 to D2). When destination GI 
D1, which is in the communication path, becomes malicious 
with an HT in its control logic, the detector bank of D1 can be 
partially tuned to the utilized wavelength channels to snoop 
data. In the example shown in Fig. 2(b), D1 snoops ‘0110’ from 
the wavelength channels that are destined to D2. The snooped 
data from D1 can be transferred to a malicious core within the 
CMP to determine sensitive information.  
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 3: Impact of (a) malicious modulator (source) bank, (b) malicious detector 
(destination) bank on data in DWDM-based photonic waveguides. 
 
 In addition to data corruption and snooping attacks 
(illustrated in Fig. 3), malicious MRs in MWMR links can also 
cause Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as briefly described in 
Section III.B. The adverse impacts of such DoS attacks can be 
mitigated by implementing cross-layer strategies that promote 
self-monitoring and self-adaptation in PNoCs (e.g., [45] 
presents such strategies for a hybrid electrical-wireless NoC). 
On the other hand, the impacts of data corruption attacks can be 
mitigated by employing conventional error detection and 
correction mechanisms (e.g., [46]). However, our focus in this 
work is to prevent data snooping attacks. This is because 
snooping attacks from malicious destination GIs are hard to 
detect, as they do not disrupt the intended communication 
among CMP cores. Moreover, it is difficult to detect a snooping 
attack by monitoring the drop in the received signal power level 
due to the partially extracted optical power by the snooping 
MRs. This is because thermal-induced fluctuations can also 
cause similar drop in the received signal power level, which 
makes it almost impossible to infer whether a snooping attack 
or thermal-induced power fluctuation is the real cause behind 
the drop in the received power level. Therefore, there is a 
pressing need to address the security risks imposed by snooping 
GIs in DWDM-based PNoC architectures. To address this need, 
we propose a novel framework called SOTERIA that improves 
hardware security in DWDM-based PNoC architectures. 
IV. SOTERIA FRAMEWORK: OVERVIEW 
Our proposed multi-layer SOTERIA framework enables 
secure unicast and multicast communications in DWDM-based 
PNoC architectures. Fig. 4 gives a high-level overview of this 
framework. From the figure, the framework integrates two 
security enhancing strategies: (i) Privy Data Encipherment 
Scheme (PDES), and (ii) Reservation-Assisted Metadata 
Protection Scheme (RAMPS). PDES uses the PV profiles of the 
detector MRs to generate unclonable keys that are used for 
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encrypting data before transmission. To enable secure sharing 
of the generated encryption keys, PDES incorporates 
communication metadata (e.g., identity of target destination GI, 
type of communication – unicast or multicast) into its data 
encryption-decryption process. PDES is sufficient to protect 
data from snooping GIs as long as the utilized communication 
metadata can be kept secret. But the security of communication 
metadata from snooping attacks is at risk in many PNoC 
architectures (e.g., [11], [27]) as these PNoCs use the same 
waveguide to transmit both the communication metadata and 
actual data. To further enhance security for these PNoCs, we 
devise an architecture-level Reservation-Assisted Metadata 
Protection Scheme (RAMPS) that uses a secure reservation 
waveguide to avoid the stealing of communication metadata by 
snooping GIs. The combination of PDES and RAMPS schemes 
makes it very difficult for HTs and malicious program instances 
to snoop data. The next two sections present details of our 
PDES and RAMPS schemes. 
Note that our encryption-based data security method, which 
is part of our proposed SOTERIA framework, is different from 
the traditional Authenticated Encryption (AE) [55][56] used for 
electronic NoCs in three ways. First, our framework proposes 
to utilize the information on the PV profiles of MRs as the 
system entropy to seed the symmetric key generation process. 
Doing so can achieve better security, as it can make the initial 
conditions, and hence, the final outcome of the key generation 
process much more difficult for an attacker to predict. Second, 
our PDES scheme, which is part of our SOTERIA framework, 
generates and utilizes destination specific encryption keys. 
Therefore, only the source nodes that have the specific key 
corresponding to a destination node can send encrypted data 
packets to the destination node, thereby ensuring the 
authenticity of data packets in addition to their confidentiality. 
Third, the traditional AE scheme for electronic NoCs does not 
protect the confidentiality of metadata itself, which is very 
important to achieve dependable routing of data packets to 
intended destinations. In contrast, our proposed RAMPS 
scheme can protect the confidentiality of metadata as well. 
Thus, our SOTERIA framework (PDES + RAMPS) utilizes 
encryption and decryption processes for PNoCs in a novel and 
functionally different manner compared to the traditional AE 
mechanism for electronic NoCs. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Overview of proposed SOTERIA framework that integrates a circuit-
level Privy Data Encipherment Scheme (PDES) and an architecture-level 
Reservation-Assisted Metadata Protection Scheme (RAMPS). 
V. PRIVY DATA ENCIPHERMENT SCHEME (PDES) 
As discussed earlier (Section III.C), malicious destination 
GIs can snoop data from a shared waveguide. One way of 
addressing this security concern is to use data encryption so that 
the malicious destination GIs cannot decipher the snooped data. 
For the encrypted data to be truly undecipherable, the malicious 
GIs in a PNoC must not be able to clone the algorithm (or 
method) used to generate the keys used for data encryption. To 
generate unclonable encryption keys, our Privy Data 
Encipherment Scheme (PDES) uses the PV profiles of MRs. As 
discussed in [14], PV induces random shifts in the resonance 
wavelengths of the MRs used in a PNoC. These resonance shifts 
can be in the range from -3nm to 3nm [14]. The MRs that 
belong to different GIs in a PNoC have different PV profiles. In 
fact, the MRs that belong to different MR banks of the same GI 
also have different PV profiles. Due to their random nature, 
these MR PV profiles cannot be cloned by the malicious GIs, 
which makes the encryption keys generated using these PV 
profiles truly unclonable. Using the PV profiles of MRs, PDES 
can generate a unique encryption key for each MR bank in a 
PNoC. 
For the encrypted data to be truly undecipherable, the 
unclonable key used for data encryption should be kept secret 
from the snooping GIs, which can be challenging as the identity 
of the snooping GIs in a PNoC is not known. Therefore, it 
becomes very difficult to decide whether or not to share the 
encryption key with a destination GI (that can be malicious) for 
data decryption. Moreover, in case of multicast communication 
with a PNoC, an encrypted data message can be communicated 
to more than one destination GI simultaneously. This makes it 
even more difficult to decide which destination GIs to share the 
encryption key with. To resolve this key-sharing conundrum, 
PDES makes use of the following information about the 
communicated data messages: (i) identity of target destination 
GIs, (ii) type of data communication – unicast or multicast. This 
important information about the communicated data messages 
is referred to as communication metadata henceforth. PDES 
employs this communication metadata for its key generation, 
key sharing, and data encryption-decryption processes, which 
are described next. 
A. Key Generation and Sharing with PDES 
As discussed earlier, PDES utilizes the PV profiles of MRs 
to generate unclonable encryption keys. But MRs employed in 
a PNoC can be categorized as modulator MRs, detector MRs, 
and switches (i.e., MRs that can route photonic wavelength 
signals in PNoCs). This raises an obvious question: PV profiles 
of which category of MRs should be used to generate 
unclonable encryption keys? Generally, the PV profiles of MRs 
of any category can be utilized to generate unclonable 
encryption keys. But PDES utilizes PV profiles of the 
destination GIs’ detector MRs to generate encryption keys, as 
doing so renders the following useful properties to the 
generated keys: (i) different encryption keys can be generated 
for unicast and multicast communications, (ii) a unique 
encryption key can be generated for each destination GI of 
every MWMR waveguide, and (iii) the generated encryption 
keys can be shared and used securely, yielding an efficient 
solution to the key-sharing conundrum. We will discuss the 
origins and benefits of these properties later in this section. 
 
Another question that begs attention is: how to measure and put 
the PV profiles of thousands of MRs a PNoC might have, to 
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work for key generation? PDES generates encryption keys from 
MR PV profiles during the testing phase of the CMP. For that, 
it measures the PV-induced resonance shifts in all MRs of every 
destination GI’s detector bank in situ, using dithering signal-
based control circuits from [15]. For each detector MR of every 
destination GI, the corresponding control circuit (i.e., from 
[15]) generates an anti-symmetric analog error signal. This 
analog error signal is proportional to the PV-induced resonance 
shift in the detector MR during the testing phase of the CMP, 
whereas it to proportional to the net resonance shift in the 
detector MR due to the combined effects of PV and dynamic 
thermal variations (TV) during the dynamic operation of the 
CMP. During the dynamic operation of the CMP, PDES uses 
this anti-symmetric analog error signal to control the carrier 
injection into and heating of the MR to remedy the induced net 
shift in its resonance (due to the combined effects of PV and 
TV). On the other hand, during the static testing phase of the 
CMP, PDES converts the analog error signal from each 
individual detector MR into an 8-bit digital error signal. Thus, 
an 8-bit digital error signal is generated for each detector MR 
of every destination GI. We consider 64 DWDM wavelengths 
per waveguide, and hence, we have 64 detector MRs in every 
destination GI’s detector bank. As an 8-bit digital error signal is 
generated from each individual detector MR, a total of 64 
digital error signals (8-bits each) are generated for each detector 
bank of every destination GI. These 64 digital error signals (of 
8-bit each) per detector bank per destination GI are utilized in 
two different ways to generate two different encryption keys: 
one key for unicast communications and one key for multicast 
communications, as described next.  
 
Unicast communications: For each destination GI, our PDES 
scheme appends all 64 digital error signals (of 8-bits each) 
corresponding to the 64 detector MRs in a randomly selected 
permutational order to create a unique 512-bit encryption key 
for unicast communications (referred to as unicast key 
henceforth). Different destination GIs append their respective 
64 8-bit error signals in different permutational orders 
(randomly selected at design time) to derive their unicast keys. 
Having a uniquely different unicast key for every destination GI 
enables PDES to protect each unicast key from malicious 
snooping GIs. This is because it eliminates the need of sharing 
a unicast key that is specific to a destination GI with any other 
secure or malicious destination GI. Thus, our PDES scheme 
enables low cost generation and secure utilization of PV-based 
encryption keys to be used for unicast communications. Since 
we use unique keys for each destination GI, the frequency of 
the same key being used is low, thus making this scheme 
reasonably immune to various ciphertext attacks (e.g., [47]) 
typically used for deducing the key. Moreover, because of a 
very large number of available permutational orders (i.e., 64!) 
in which the constituent 64 error signals can be appended to 
derive a unicast key, it becomes highly unlikely to have the 
encryption keys of any two destination GIs in the PNoC to be 
the same, even if the available PV range for the PNoC does not 
scale up with the number of GIs in the PNoC. Thus, PDES is 
highly scalable.  
 
Multicast communications: In PNoCs, some messages (e.g., 
cache coherence messages) need to be communicated with 
multiple destination GIs simultaneously, which establishes the 
need for multicast communication capability in PNoCs. As 
discussed earlier, to enable data multicast in a waveguide that 
connects multiple destination GIs, the tuning circuit of each 
target destination GI partially detunes its detector MRs from 
their resonance wavelengths [8], [12]-[13], such that a 
significant portion of the photonic signal energy in the data-
carrying wavelengths continues to propagate in the waveguide 
to be absorbed in all subsequent target destination GIs. Thus, 
the partial tunability of the destination GIs’ detector MRs 
enables efficient multicasting in PNoCs. Like unicast 
communications, PDES uses data encryption to secure 
multicast communications as well. But the key used for 
encrypting such multicast messages (referred to as multicast 
key, henceforth) cannot be designed to be specific to one or 
more destination GIs. This is because each multicast message 
is generally sent to a group of destination GIs (referred to as 
multicast group). Many different combinations of destination 
GIs are possible to form many possible target multicast groups. 
Therefore, utilizing a specific key for each target multicast 
group can incur excessive overheads for key generation, 
storage, and sharing. To avoid this overhead, a single multicast 
key should be used that is common for all possible target 
multicast groups, such that any target multicast group can 
decrypt its received multicast message using the multicast key. 
Such multicast keys cannot be protected from malicious 
destination GIs, as they may very likely be shared with all 
destination GIs, including the malicious ones, for data 
decryption. However, this does not mean that multicast 
communications cannot be secured using data encryption. 
PDES employs communication metadata (i.e., the information 
about the type of communication – unicast or multicast) in its 
data encryption process to achieve secure multicast 
communications. To generate a multicast key for an MWMR 
waveguide, PDES XORs all 512-bit unicast keys corresponding 
to all destination GIs that share the MWMR waveguide. Thus, 
PDES generates one 512-bit multicast key for every MWMR 
waveguide in a PNoC. 
In summary, our use of such indirectly and in situ measured 
(using the dithering signal based sensing/control mechanism 
from [15]) process variation profile of MRs for encryption key 
generation provides three-pronged advantages: (1) It enables 
generation of keys that are different from one another not only 
across different detector banks and gateway interfaces of a 
single chip, but also across different chips, which can 
strengthen the capabilities of ensuring the confidentiality, 
authenticity and integrity of intra-chip as well as inter-chip 
communications. (2) It enables the generation of destination-
specific unclonable keys in situ, deeming the use of external 
random key generators unnecessary. This integrated in-situ 
approach can reduce significant time and effort during mass 
production of CMPs. (3) This integrated in-situ approach also 
enables easy upgrades of the key generation process in the 
future; not only the process variation profile, but also the 
thermal variation and aging profiles of MRs can be indirectly 
measured and leveraged down the road using the same sensing 
mechanism from [15] to generate unclonable keys. 
B. Data Encryption-Decryption with PDES 
To understand how the 512-bit unicast and multicast keys are 
utilized to encrypt data in photonic links, consider Fig. 5 which 
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depicts an example photonic link that has one MWMR 
waveguide and connects the modulator banks of two source GIs 
(S1 and S2) with the detector banks of three destination GIs (D1, 
D2, and D3). As there are three destination GIs on this link, 
PDES creates three 512-bit unicast keys corresponding to them 
and stores them at respective destination GIs and both source 
GIs. Moreover, PDES creates one 512-bit multicast key specific 
to the MWMR waveguide and stores it at all source and 
destination GIs (i.e., S1, S2, D1, D2, and D3). Thus, in Fig. 4, 
every source GI stores three 512-bit unicast keys (for 
destination GIs D1, D2, and D3) and the 512-bit multicast key in 
its local ROM, whereas every destination GI stores only its 
corresponding 512-bit unicast key along with the 512-bit 
multicast key in its ROM. When data is to be transmitted by a 
source GI, depending on the type of communication, the 
appropriate key from its local ROM is used to encrypt data at 
the packet-level granularity, using the XOR cipher algorithm 
[50] that performs an XOR between the key and the 512-bit data 
packet. 
 
Fig. 5: Overview of proposed PV-based security-enhancing Privy Data 
Encipherment Scheme (PDES). 
Unicast communication example: Suppose S1 wants to send a 
data packet to D3. S1 first accesses the 512-bit unicast key 
corresponding to D3 from its local ROM and XORs the data 
packet with this key, and then transmits the encrypted data 
packet over the link. At D3, the data packet needs to be received 
and then decrypted using the correct key (either the unicast key 
or multicast key) that it has. To be able to receive (filter out) the 
data packet on the waveguide, D3 needs to know that the 
incoming packet is intended for it. Similarly, to be able to use 
the correct key for decryption, D3 also needs to know if the 
received data packet is multicast or unicast. Typically, in PNoCs 
that use photonic links with multiple destination GIs, the source 
GI communicates the identity of the target destination GI and 
type of transmitted data packet beforehand, during the 
reservation selection phase (SectionVI). Therefore, in our 
example, S1 would have informed D3 beforehand about the 
target and type of the transmitted data packet. As a result, D3 is 
able to receive the packet and select the correct key for 
decryption. At D3, the received data packet is decrypted by 
XORing it with the 512-bit unicast key corresponding to D3 
from its local ROM. In this scheme, even if the malicious 
destination GI D1 snoops the data intended for D3, it cannot 
decipher the data as it neither knows the target destination for 
the snooped data nor can it access the correct key (unicast key 
corresponding to D3) for decryption. 
Multicast communication example: Suppose S1 wants to 
multicast a data packet to D2 and D3, then S1 first accesses the 
512-bit multicast key from its local ROM and XORs the data 
packet with this key, and then transmits the encrypted data 
packet over the link. Both D2 and D3 would have been informed 
about the transmitted packet beforehand, therefore, both D2 and 
D3 would be able to receive the multicast data packet. The 
received data packet is then decrypted at both D2 and D3 by 
XORing it with the 512-bit multicast key stored in the local 
ROMs of D2 and D3. In this scheme, if D1 snoops the multicast 
data packet, it cannot decipher the data in spite of having access 
to the correct multicast key in its ROM. This is because D1 does 
not know that its snooped data is multicast, and therefore, it 
does not know whether to use the unicast key or multicast key 
from its ROM for data decryption. 
Thus, our PDES scheme protects unicast and multicast data 
communications against snooping attacks in DWDM based 
PNoCs. 
C. Overheads of Implementing PDES 
Here we provide a general discussion of the latency, area, and 
power overheads of our PDES scheme, although the detailed 
results for the system-level overhead analysis of our SOTERIA 
framework will be discussed later in the evaluation section 
(Section VIII). As PDES generates the unicast and multicast 
keys during the testing phase of the CMP chip, the XOR logic 
used for key generation does not need to be implemented on the 
CMP chip. As a result, no overhead of key generation is 
incurred in the CMP chip. Further, the dithering signal based 
control mechanism used in the key generation process also does 
not incur any extra overhead, as such a control system is not 
integrated on the CMP chip for key generation purpose 
exclusively, rather it is added for in-situ remedying of PV-
induced resonance shifts in MRs. Thus, our key generation 
process using PDES does not incur any extra area overhead on 
the CMP chip. However, the use of the ROM to store the 
generated keys incurs some area and power overhead at every 
GI. The resulting overall (system-wide) overhead depends on 
the underlying PNoC architecture. Moreover, data encryption 
at the source GI and data decryption at the destination GI, each 
requires two steps: (i) accessing the key from the ROM, and (ii) 
XORing the key with the data packet. As the key access step 
can be overlapped with the reservation selection phase (Section 
VI) for both data encryption and data decryption, the latency 
overhead of this step can be ignored. On the other hand, the 
XORing step incurs 1 extra cycle delay for data encryption and 
data decryption each. This delay along with the area and power 
overheads are accounted for in our system-level overhead 
analysis presented in Section VIII. 
D. Limitations of PDES 
This section presents circumstances in which unicast and 
multicast communications cannot be secured in spite of using 
PDES at the circuit-level, and consequently motivates the need 
for a complementary security solution at the architecture-level. 
Unicast communications: For the unicast data protected with 
PDES to be deciphered, a snooping GI must have access to (i) 
the unicast key corresponding to the target destination GI, and 
(ii) the identity information of the target destination GI. As 
discussed earlier, a unicast key is stored only at all source GIs 
and at the corresponding destination GI, which makes it 
physically inaccessible to a snooping destination GI. However, 
if more than one GI in a PNoC are compromised due to HTs in 
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their control units and if these HTs launch a coordinated 
snooping attack, then it may be possible for the snooping GI to 
access the unicast key corresponding to the target destination 
GI.  
For instance, consider the photonic link in Fig. 4. If both S1 
and D1 are compromised, then the HT in S1’s control unit can 
access the unicast keys corresponding to D1, D2, and D3 from its 
ROM and transfer them to a malicious core (a core running a 
malicious program). Moreover, the HT in D1’s control unit can 
snoop the data intended for D3 and transfer it to the malicious 
core. Thus, the malicious core may have access to the snooped 
data as well as the unicast keys stored at the source GIs. 
Nevertheless, accessing the unicast keys stored at the source 
GIs is not sufficient for the malicious GI (or core) to decipher 
the snooped data. This is because the compromised ROM 
typically has multiple unicast keys corresponding to multiple 
destination GIs, and choosing the correct unicast key that can 
decipher data at any given time requires the knowledge of the 
target destination GI. Thus, PDES can secure unicast data 
communications in PNoCs even if the unicast keys are 
compromised, as long as the malicious GIs (or cores) do not 
know the target destinations for the snooped data. 
Multicast communications: Unlike unicast keys, multicast 
keys are not secret from snooping destination GIs by design. 
Rather all destination GIs, including the malicious ones, are 
expected to have access to the multicast keys. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Section V.B, if a malicious destination GI snoops 
the multicast data packet, it cannot decipher the data in spite of 
having access to the correct multicast key in its ROM. This is 
because the malicious GI does not know that its snooped data is 
multicast, and therefore, it does not know whether to use the 
unicast key or multicast key from its ROM for data decryption. 
Thus, PDES can secure multicast data communications in 
PNoCs, as long as the malicious GIs (or cores) do not know 
the type of the snooped data.  
In summary, PDES can protect unicast and multicast data 
from being deciphered by a snooping GI, as long as the 
communication metadata (i.e., information about the target 
destination GI and type of data communication) associated with 
the snooped data can be kept secret from the snooping GI. But 
unfortunately, many PNoC architectures, e.g., [11], [27], that 
employ photonic links with multiple destination GIs utilize the 
same waveguide to transmit both the actual data and 
communication metadata. In these PNoCs, if a malicious GI 
manages to tap the communication metadata from the shared 
waveguide, then it can determine the nature of the 
communication and its intended target(s), and then access the 
correct key from the compromised ROM to decipher the 
snooped data. Thus, there is a need to conceal the 
communication metadata from malicious GIs (cores). This 
motivates us to propose an architecture-level solution, as 
discussed next. 
VI. RESERVATION-ASSISTED METADATA PROTECTION 
SCHEME 
In PNoCs that use photonic links with multiple destination 
GIs, data is typically transferred in two time-division-
multiplexed (TDM) slots called reservation slot and data slot 
[11], [27]. To minimize photonic hardware, PNoCs use the same 
waveguide to transfer both slots, as shown in Fig. 6(a). To 
enable reservation of the waveguide, each destination is 
assigned a reservation selection wavelength. In Fig. 6(a), 𝛌𝛌1 and 
𝛌𝛌2 are the reservation selection wavelengths corresponding to 
destination GIs D1 and D2, respectively. When a destination GI 
detects only its corresponding reservation selection wavelength 
in the reservation slot, it knows that the incoming data message 
in the subsequent data slot will be a unicast. For example, in 
Fig. 6(a), D2 can detect its corresponding reservation 
wavelength λ2 in the reservation slot to know that data will be 
unicast to it in the subsequent data slot. Therefore, D2 can 
switch ON its detector bank for data reception and select the 
appropriate unicast key from its ROM for data decryption. 
Similarly, a destination GI can know if the incoming data is 
multicast by detecting multiple reservation selection 
wavelengths in the reservation slot, informing itself to partially 
switch ON its detector bank for multicast data reception and 
select the appropriate multicast key for data decryption. Thus, 
the traditional reservation-assisted method of communication 
(Fig. 6(a)) utilizes the same waveguide to transmit both the 
communication metadata (using reservation selection 
wavelengths) and actual data in two separate TDM slots. This 
traditional reservation assisted method of communication refers 
to the MWMR concurrent token stream receiver selection 
strategy from [35]. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 6: Reservation-assisted data transmission in DWDM-based photonic 
waveguides (a) without RAMPS, and (b) with RAMPS. 
 
 However, in the presence of an HT, a malicious GI can tap 
communication metadata from the shared waveguide during the 
reservation slot using the same detector bank that is used for 
data reception. Tapping of communication metadata can 
provide the malicious GI with important information that 
enables it to choose the correct encryption key from the 
compromised ROM to decipher its snooped data. For example, 
in Fig. 6(a), malicious GI D1 is using one of its detectors to 
snoop 𝛌𝛌2 from the reservation slot. By snooping λ2, D1 can 
identify that the data it will snoop in the subsequent data slot 
will be intended for destination D2. Thus, D1 can now choose 
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the correct encryption key from the compromised ROM to 
decipher its snooped data. 
To address this security risk, we propose an architecture-
level Reservation-Assisted Metadata Protection Scheme 
(RAMPS). In RAMPS, we add a reservation waveguide, whose 
main function is to carry reservation slots, whereas the data 
waveguide carries data slots. This reservation waveguide lays 
in parallel to the data waveguide, and therefore, it does not 
intersect with the data waveguide. Rather it is connected to the 
data waveguide through double MR switches as shown in Fig. 
6(b). We use double MRs to switch the signals of reservation 
slots from the data waveguide to the reservation waveguide, as 
shown in Fig. 6(b). Double MRs are used instead of single MRs 
for switching to ensure that the switched signals do not reverse 
their propagation direction after switching [29]. Compared to 
single MRs, double MRs also have lower signal loss due to 
steeper roll-off of their filter responses [29]. The double MRs 
are switched ON only when the photonic link is in a reservation 
slot, otherwise they are switched OFF to let the signals of the 
data slot pass by in the data waveguide. 
Furthermore, in RAMPS, each destination GI has only two 
detectors on the reservation waveguide, one of which 
corresponds to the GI’s receiver selection wavelength and the 
other corresponds to a wavelength signal that transmits 
communication type information. For example, in Fig. 6(b), D1 
and D2 will have detectors corresponding to their reservation 
selection wavelengths 𝛌𝛌1 and 𝛌𝛌3, respectively, on the 
reservation waveguide. In addition, D1 and D2 will also have 
detectors corresponding to wavelength signals λ2 and λ4, 
respectively, that transmit communication type information. 
Henceforth, wavelengths λ1 (λ3) and λ2 (λ4) are referred to as 
metadata wavelengths of D1 (D2) and their corresponding 
detectors on the reservation waveguide are referred to as 
metadata detectors of D1 (D2). For D1 (D2), the presence of its 
reservation selection wavelength λ1 (λ3) and absence of its 
communication type wavelength λ2 (λ4) in the reservation 
waveguide indicates that the incoming data in the next data slot 
will be unicast to D1 (D2), whereas the presence of both 
metadata wavelengths λ1 (λ3) and λ2 (λ4) indicates that the 
incoming data will be multicast to multiple destination GIs 
including D1 (D2). Similarly, the absence of the reservation 
selection wavelength λ1 (λ3) indicates that D1 (D2) will not 
receive any data in the next data slot. Thus, destination GIs can 
receive important communication metadata on their 
corresponding metadata wavelengths, using their metadata 
detectors in the reservation slot. The destination GIs utilize this 
communication metadata to prepare their detector bank for data 
reception in the data slot and select the appropriate encryption 
key (unicast or multicast key) for data decryption. 
The use of the separate reservation waveguide and metadata 
detectors makes it difficult for the malicious GI D1 to snoop 
metadata wavelengths (λ3 and λ4) of D2 from the reservation slot 
as shown in Fig. 5(b). This is because D1 does not have 
metadata detectors corresponding to D2’s metadata wavelengths 
(λ3 and λ4) on the reservation waveguide. However, the HT in 
D1’s control unit may still attempt to snoop D2’s metadata 
wavelengths (λ3 and λ4) in the reservation slot by retuning D1’s 
metadata detectors. But succeeding in these attempts would 
require the HT to perfect the timing and target wavelengths of 
its snooping attack, which is very difficult due to the large 
number of utilized metadata wavelengths corresponding to the 
large number of destination GIs. Thus, D1 cannot know the 
communication metadata, and therefore, cannot identify the 
correct key to decipher the snooped data.  
In summary, RAMPS enhances security in PNoCs by 
protecting both the actual data as well as the communication 
metadata from snooping attacks, even if the encryption keys 
used to secure data are compromised. However, note that the 
scalability of our RAMPS mechanism is limited by the DWDM 
capacity of photonic data waveguides in a PNoC. As our 
RAMPS mechanism requires two dedicated metadata 
wavelength signals per destination GI, its application is limited 
to PNoCs that have only up to Nλ/2 destination GIs connected 
per data waveguide, given that the waveguide can support 
multiplexing of only up to Nλ wavelength signals. 
VII. IMPLEMENTING SOTERIA ON PNOCS 
We characterize the impact of SOTERIA on three popular 
PNoC architectures: Firefly [8], SwiftNoC [35] and LumiNoC 
[13], all of which use DWDM-based photonic waveguides for 
data communication. We consider Firefly PNoC with 8×8 
SWMR crossbar [8], SwiftNoC PNoC with 32×32 MWMR 
crossbar [35] with concurrent token stream arbitration, and 
LumiNoC with 4-layer 1-row photonic network with MWMR 
waveguides. We adapt the analytical equations from [29] to 
model the signal power loss and required laser power in the 
SOTERIA-enhanced Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC PNoCs. 
At each source and destination GI of the SOTERIA-enhanced 
Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC PNoCs, XOR gates are 
required to enable parallel encryption and decryption of 512-bit 
data packets. As discussed in Section V.C, we consider a 1 cycle 
delay overhead for each encryption and decryption of every 
data packet. The area and energy consumption for 512 XOR 
gate with 2-bit input is 0.302 nm2 and 0.241 pJ using the 11nm 
FinFET standard cell library [22]. Moreover, we use nonvolatile 
ReRAM technology to implement the ROM for key storage, 
and we model this ReRAM using NVSim [44]. The overall laser 
power and delay overheads for all of these PNoCs are quantified 
in the results section. 
Firefly PNoC: Firefly PNoC [8], for a 256-core system, has 8 
clusters (C1-C8) with 32 cores in each cluster. Firefly uses 
reservation-assisted SWMR data channels in its 8x8 crossbar 
for inter-cluster communication. Each data channel consists of 
8 SWMR waveguides, with 64 DWDM wavelengths in each 
waveguide. To integrate SOTERIA with Firefly PNoC, we 
added a reservation waveguide to every SWMR channel. Each 
destination GI has 2 metadata detector MRs on the reservation 
waveguide where the first one is used to detect the reservation 
selection wavelength and the second one is used to detect the 
communication type wavelength. Therefore, in total, this 
reservation waveguide has 14 metadata detector MRs 
corresponding to 7 destination GIs. Furthermore, 64 double 
MRs (corresponding to 64 DWDM wavelengths) are used at 
each reservation waveguide to implement RAMPS. To enable 
PDES, each source GI has a ROM with eight entries of 512 bits 
each to store seven 512-bit unicast keys (corresponding to seven 
destination GIs) and one 512-bit multicast key. In addition, each 
destination GI requires a ROM with two entries of 512-bits each 
to store the 512-bit multicast key and its own 512-bit unicast 
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key. In total, SOTERIA incurs total photonic hardware overhead 
of 14 metadata detectors, 64 double MRs, and a reservation 
waveguide for each SWMR data channel. The area overhead of 
ROM at a source GI for 8 entries is 0.016μm2 and at a 
destination GI for two entries is 0.004μm2. 
SwiftNoC PNoC: We also integrate SOTERIA with a 256-core 
32-node SwiftNoC PNoC [35] with eight cores in each node 
and 16 MWMR data channels for inter-node communication. 
Furthermore, these 256 cores are divided into 4 clusters (each 
cluster has 64 cores) to enable dynamic re-prioritization and 
exchange of bandwidth between clusters of cores. Each 
MWMR data channel has four MWMR waveguides and it 
connects 32 source GIs and 32 destination GIs. Out of the four 
MWMR waveguides per MWMR data channel, three 
waveguides have 64 DWDM wavelengths and one waveguide 
has 68 DWDM wavelengths. In SOTERIA-enhanced SwiftNoC, 
we add a reservation waveguide to each MWMR data channel.  
Like Firefly, each destination GI of the SwiftNoC also has 2 
metadata detector MRs on each reservation waveguide which 
are used to detect the reservation selection and communication 
type wavelengths. Therefore, in total, each reservation 
waveguide has 64 metadata detector MRs corresponding to 32 
destination GIs. To enable PDES, each source GI requires a 
ROM with 32 entries of 512 bits each to store 31 512-bit unicast 
keys and one 512-bit multicast key, whereas each destination 
GI requires a ROM with two entries of 512 bits each to store 
one 512-bit multicast key and its corresponding 512-bit unicast 
key. SOTERIA incurs total photonic hardware overhead 64 
metadata detectors, 64 double MRs, and a reservation 
waveguide per MWMR data channel. The area overhead of 
ROM at a source GI for 32 entries is 0.064 μm2 and at a 
destination GI for two entries is 0.004 μm2. 
LumiNoC PNoC: Lastly, we integrate SOTERIA with a 256-
core 64-tile LumiNoC PNoC [13] with 16 MWMR data 
channels for inter-tile communication. The 64-tiles are arranged 
in an 8×8 grid with each tile having four cores that are 
interconnected using a concentrator. Among the 16 MWMR 
data channels, 8 MWMR channels are laid out horizontally and 
the remaining 8 MWMR channels are laid out vertically. In the 
8×8 grid of tiles, each horizontal MWMR channel connects 8 
tiles that constitute one of the 8 rows of the grid, whereas each 
vertical MWMR channel connects 8 tiles that constitute one of 
the 8 columns of the grid. Each MWMR data channel in 
LumiNoC has four MWMR waveguides and connects with total 
8 source GIs and 8 destination GIs corresponding to 8 tiles. 
Each of these four waveguides has 64 DWDM wavelengths 
which are used for arbitration, receiver selection, and data 
transfer. In SOTERIA-enhanced LumiNoC, we add a 
reservation waveguide to each MWMR data channel. Similar to 
Firefly and SwiftNoC, each destination GI of LumiNoC also 
has 2 metadata detector MRs on the reservation waveguide 
which are used to detect the reservation selection and 
communication type wavelengths. Therefore, each reservation 
waveguide has 16 metadata detector MRs corresponding to 8 
destination GIs. To enable PDES, each source GI requires a 
ROM with 7 entries of 512 bits each to store eight 512-bit 
unicast keys and one 512-bit multicast key, whereas each 
destination GI requires a ROM with two entries of 512 bits each 
to store one 512-bit multicast key and one 512-bit unicast key. 
SOTERIA incurs total photonic hardware overhead of 16 
metadata detectors, 64 double MRs, and a reservation 
waveguide per MWMR data channel. The photonic area 
overhead is evaluated in Section VIII. The area overhead of 
ROM at a source GI for 8 entries is 0.016 μm2 and at a 
destination GI for two entries is 0.004 μm2. 
Modeling PV of MR Devices in PNoCs: Similar to [29] and 
[57], we adapt the VARIUS tool [20] to model random and 
systematic die-to-die (D2D) as well as within-die (WID) 
process variations in MRs for the Firefly, SwiftNoC and 
LumiNoC PNoCs. We model process variations in MRs in 
terms of induced resonance shifts in them. The key modeling 
parameters are mean (μ), variance (σ), and density (ω) of a 
variable (i.e., MR resonance shift) that follow the normal 
distribution. The mean (μ) is an MR’s nominal resonance 
wavelength. We consider a DWDM wavelength range in the 
optical C- and L-bands, with a starting wavelength of 1550 nm 
and a channel spacing of 0.8 nm, generating a comb of 
wavelengths that fills the free-spectral-range (FSR). Hence, 
each modeled MR’s mean coincides with the corresponding 
wavelength in the comb. The variance (σ) of wavelength 
variation is determined based on the laboratory fabrication data 
[14] and our target die size. We consider a 256-core chip with a 
die size of 400 mm2 at a 22-nm process node. For this die size, 
we consider a WID standard deviation (σWID) in resonance 
wavelength of 0.61 nm [57] and D2D standard deviation (σD2D) 
of 1.01 nm [57]. We also consider a density (ω) of 0.5 [20] for 
this die size, which is the parameter that determines the range 
of WID spatial correlation required by the VARIUS tool. With 
these parameters, we use VARIUS to generate 100 PV maps of 
the 400 mm2 chip. Each of these maps contains over 1 million 
parts, each of which has an associated value that indicates what 
the resonance shift in an MR would be if the MR is 
implemented on that part of the chip. We map the schematic 
physical layouts of our considered PNoC architectures on to 
these PV maps to estimate the locations of MRs in the PNoCs 
on the PV maps, to consequently determine the PV-induced 
resonance shifts in the MRs. 
VIII. EVALUATION 
A. Evaluation Setup 
To evaluate our proposed SOTERIA (PDES+RAMPS) 
security enhancement framework, we integrate it with the 
Firefly [8], SwiftNoC [35], and LumiNoC [10] PNoCs, as 
explained in Section VII. We modeled and performed 
simulation based analysis of the PDES-enhanced and 
SOTERIA-enhanced Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC PNoCs 
using a cycle-accurate SystemC based NoC simulator, for a 
256-core single-chip architecture at 22nm. Microarchitectural 
parameters of the manycore system are presented in Table I. We 
validated the simulator in terms of power dissipation and energy 
consumption based on results obtained from the DSENT tool 
[22]. We used real-world traffic from the PARSEC benchmark 
suite [23]. GEM5 full-system simulation [24] of parallelized 
PARSEC applications was used to generate traces that were fed 
into our NoC simulator. We set a “warmup” period of 100 
million instructions and then captured traces for the subsequent 
1 billion instructions. These traces are extracted from parallel 
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regions of execution of PARSEC applications. The applications 
considered for our analysis are stream clusters (SC), bodytrack 
(BT), canneal (CN), facesim (FS), blackscholes (BS), ferret 
(FT), swap-tions (SW), fluidanimate (FA), vips (VI), dedup 
(DD), freqmine (FQ), and X-264. We performed geometric 
calculations for a 20mm×20mm chip size, to determine lengths 
of SWMR and MWMR waveguides in Firefly, SwiftNoC, and 
LumiNoC. Based on this analysis, we estimated the time needed 
for light to travel from the first to the last node as 8 cycles at 5 
GHz clock frequency [35] for Firefly and SwiftNoC PNoCs. 
Furthermore, we also estimated that the time needed for light to 
travel from the first to the last node of LumiNoC’s MWMR 
waveguide is 4 cycles at the same clock frequency. We use a 
512-bit packet size, as advocated in the Firefly, SwiftNoC and 
LumiNoC PNoCs. 
 
Table I, Micro-Architectural Parameters for Manycore System 
Number of cores 64 
Threads per core 1 
Per Core: 
L1 I-Cache size/Associativity 32 KB/Direct Mapped Cache 
L1 D-Cache size/Associativity 32 KB/Direct Mapped Cache 
L2 Coherence MOESI 
Frequency 2 GHz 
Issue Policy In-order 
Memory controllers 8 
Main memory 8 GB; DDR5@30 ns 
 
The static and dynamic energy consumption values for 
electrical routers and concentrators in PNoCs are based on 
results from DSENT [22]. We model and consider the area, 
power, and performance overheads for our framework 
implemented with the PNoCs as follows. SOTERIA with 
Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC PNoCs has an electrical area 
overhead of 12.7mm2, 3.4mm2, and, 6.5mm2, respectively, and 
power overhead of 0.44W, 0.36W, and, 0.42W, respectively, 
using gate-level analysis and the CACTI 7.0 [25] tool for 
memory and buffers. The photonic area overhead of 
implementing our SOTERIA on Firefly, SwiftNoC, and 
LumiNoC PNoCs is 0.55mm2, 1.18mm2, and 0.41mm2 
respectively, based on the physical dimensions [21] of their 
waveguides, MRs, and splitters. These area overheads are 
expected to increase the total photonic area in Firefly, 
SiwftNoC, and LumiNoC PNoCs by 8.11%, 2.36%, and 3.14%, 
respectively. For energy consumption of photonic devices, we 
adapt model parameters from recent work [26], [28] with 
0.42pJ/bit for every modulation and detection event and 
0.18pJ/bit for the tuning circuits of modulators and 
photodetectors. Photonic Power loss and Crosstalk coefficients 
are shown in Table II.  
 
Table II, Photonic Power Loss and Crosstalk Coefficients from [29] and [49]. 
Parameter type Parameter value      
Propagation loss - 0.274 dB per cm 
Bending loss -0.0085 dB per 90° 
power splitter loss -0.2 dB 
MR Q-factor 9000 
MR radius 5μm 
Detector responsivity 0.8 A/W 
Laser wall plug efficiency 10% 
 
The MR current injection tuning power is 130μW/nm from 
[54] for MRs with 3μm radius. However, from [59], tuning 
power and efficiency depend on MR size, and from [43] the 
MRs in this work have to be tuned for up to half the channel 
gap only. Therefore, as we consider the channel gap of 0.8nm, 
the value of 130μW/nm from [54] becomes 86.4μW per MR 
(≈130μW/nm×(5μm/3μm)×(0.5×0.8nm)) for current injection 
based tuning power (to remedy PV-induced red shifts). 
Similarly, the tuning power for heating (to remedy PV-induced 
blue shifts) of ~650μW/nm from [53] (i.e., up to 8.2nm tuning 
range at 5.4mW heater power) becomes ~260μW per MR 
(≈650μW×(0.5×0.8nm)) in this work. These values are listed in 
Table III, along with other power values. 
 
Table III, Power or energy-per-bit (EPB) values for various components of 
E/O and O/E conversion and resonance control modules. 
Component  EPB/Power 
E/O and O/E Conversion 
SerDes [51] 0.5 pJ/bit 
Receiver [52] 0.075 pJ/bit 
Modulator Driver [52] 0.154 pJ/bit 
Resonance Control 
Dithering Signal Based Control Circuits [15] 385 μW/MR 
Thermal Tuning [53] 260 μW/MR 
Carrier Injection Tuning [54][59] 86.4 μW/MR 
 
B. Overhead Analysis of SOTERIA on PNoCs 
Our first set of experiments compares the baseline (without 
any security enhancements) Firefly (FR), SwiftNoC (SW), and 
LumiNoC (LU) PNoCs with their PDES and SOTERIA 
enhanced variants. From Section VII, 8 SWMR data channels 
of the Firefly, 16 MWMR data channels of SwiftNoC, and 16 
MWMR data channels of LumiNoC are equipped with PDES 
encryption/decryption as well as reservation waveguides for the 
RAMPS scheme. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 7: Comparison of (a) worst-case signal loss (in dB) and (b) laser power 
dissipation of SOTERIA framework on Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC 
PNoCs with their respective baselines considering 100 process variation maps. 
 
We adapt the analytical models from [29] to calculate the 
total signal loss at the detectors of the worst-case power loss 
node (NWCPL), which corresponds to router C4R0 for the Firefly 
PNoC [8], node R63 for the SwiftNoC PNoC [35], and tile T56 
for the LumiNoC PNoC [13]. Fig. 7(a) summarizes the worst-
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
12 
case signal loss results for the baseline and SOTERIA 
configurations for the three PNoC architectures. From the 
figure, we can observe that all the PNoC architectures with 
PDES has no extra worst-case signal loss compared to their 
respective baselines. PDES encoding scheme do not add 
additional hardware on the photonic waveguide, therefore no 
additional losses are incurred in PNoC variants with PDES. 
Furthermore, Firefly PNoC with SOTERIA increases loss by 
1.7dB, SwiftNoC PNoC with SOTERIA increases loss by 
1.39dB, and LumiNoC PNoC with SOTERIA increases loss by 
1.3dB, on average, compared to their respective baselines. 
Compared to the baseline PNoCs that have no single or double 
MRs to switch the signals of the reservation slots, the double 
MRs used in the RAMPS scheme of SOTERIA-enhanced 
PNoCs to switch the wavelength signals of the reservation slots 
increase through losses in the waveguides, which ultimately 
increases the worst-case signal losses in the SOTERIA-
enhanced PNoCs. Using the worst-case signal losses shown in 
Fig. 7(a), we determine the total photonic laser power and 
corresponding electrical laser power (using laser wall-plug 
efficiency of 3% [28]) for the baseline and SOTERIA-enhanced 
variants of Firefly, SwiftNoC, and, LumiNoC PNoCs, shown in 
Fig. 7(b). From this figure, the Firefly, SwiftNoC, and 
LumiNoC PNoCs with SOTERIA have laser power overheads 
of 44.6% 37.7%, and 35% on average, compared to their 
baselines. 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 8: (a) Normalized average latency and (b) energy-delay product (EDP) 
comparison between different variants of Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC 
PNoCs for PARSEC benchmarks. Bars represent mean values of EDP for 100 
PV maps; confidence intervals show variation in EDP across 100 PV maps. The 
latency results do not get affected by PV, therefore the average latency bars do 
not have confidence intervals.  
 
Fig. 8 presents detailed simulation results that quantify the 
average packet latency and energy-delay product (EDP) for the 
three configurations (i.e., baseline, PDES) of the Firefly, 
SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC PNoCs. Results are shown for twelve 
multi-threaded PARSEC benchmarks discussed in the previous 
subsection. From Fig. 7(a), Firefly with PDES and SOTERIA 
has 5.2%, SwiftNoC with PDES and SOTERIA has 9.5%, and, 
LumiNoC with PDES and SOTERIA has 14.2% higher latency 
on average compared to their respective baselines. The 
additional delay due to encryption and decryption of data 
(Section VII.A) with PDES contributes to the increase in 
average latency. In addition, RAMPS scheme in SOTERIA does 
not contribute any additional cycles to packet transfer, therefore 
this plot shows no increase in average latency across all the 
PNoCs between PDES and SOTERIA variants. Furthermore, 
from this plot it can be observed that the average packet latency 
of SwiftNoC PNoC is higher compared to Firefly PNoC. This 
is because in SwiftNoC, all data packets traverse through 
photonic MWMR channels, and therefore they all require 
encryption-decryption that incurs a latency overhead. On the 
other hand, in Firefly which is a hybrid electric-photonic 
architecture, only a few data packets that traverse through the 
photonic SWMR channels require encryption-decryption, and 
therefore, only a few data packets incur the related latency 
overhead, reducing the average packet latency for Firefly 
compared to SwiftNoC. Moreover, the average packet latency 
for LumiNoC is higher compared to the other PNoCs, because 
a significant number of data packets in this PNoC switch 
between horizontal and vertical MWMR channels, and hence, 
undergo the encryption-decryption process twice, which in turn 
increases average packet latency for LumiNoC PNoC. 
From the results for EDP shown in Fig. 8(b), Firefly with 
PDES has 2.9%, SwiftNoC with PDES has 7.4%, and 
LumiNoC with SOTERIA has 11.8% higher EDP on average 
compared to their respective baselines. Increase in EDP for the 
PDES-enhanced PNoCs is mainly due to the increase in their 
average packet latency. In addition, a dynamic and static energy 
consumption in encryption and decryption circuitry of PDES 
also contributes to increase in EDP. Furthermore, from this plot 
it can also be seen that Firefly with SOTERIA has 5.3%, 
SwiftNoC with SOTERIA has 11.3%, and LumiNoC with 
SOTERIA has 14.6% higher EDP on average compared to their 
respective baselines. Increase in EDP for the SOTERIA-
enhanced PNoCs is not only due to the increase in their average 
packet latency contributed by PDES, but also due to the 
presence of the additional RAMPS reservation waveguides, 
which increases the required photonic hardware (e.g., more 
number of MRs) in the SOTERIA-enhanced PNoCs. This in turn 
increases static energy consumption (i.e., laser energy and 
tuning energy), ultimately increasing the EDP. From the results 
presented in this section, we can conclude that the SOTERIA 
framework improves hardware security in PNoCs at the cost of 
additional laser power, average latency, and EDP overheads. 
C. Analysis of Overhead Sensitivity 
Our last set of evaluations explore how the overhead of 
SOTERIA changes with varying levels of security in the 
network. Typically, in a CMP, only a certain portion of data that 
contains sensitive information (i.e., keys) and only a certain 
number of communication links may need to be secured. 
Therefore, for our analysis in this section, instead of securing 
all data channels of the SwiftNoC (SW) PNoC, we secure only 
a certain number channels using SOTERIA. Out of the total 16 
MWMR channels in the SwiftNoC PNoC, we secure 2 (FX-
SOTERIA-2), 4 (FX-SOTERIA-4), 8 (FX-SOTERIA-8), and 
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12 (SW-SOTERIA-12) channels, and evaluate the average 
packet latency and EDP for these variants of the SOTERIA-
enhanced SwiftNoC PNoC.  
In Fig. 9, we present average packet latency and EDP values 
for the five SOTERIA-enhanced configurations of SwiftNoC. 
From Fig. 9(a), SW-SOTERIA-2, SW-SOTERIA-4, SW-
SOTERIA-8, and, SW-SOTERIA-12 have 1.2%, 2.5%, 4.8%, 
and 7.4% higher latency on average compared to the baseline 
SwiftNoC. An increase in the number of SOTERIA enhanced 
MWMR waveguides increases the number of packets that are 
transferred through the PDES scheme, which contributes to the 
increase in average packet latency across these variants. From 
the results for EDP shown in Fig. 9(b), SW-SOTERIA-2, SW-
SOTERIA-4, SW-SOTERIA-8, and, SW-SOTERIA-12 have 
1.3%, 2.7%, 5.3%, and 8% higher EDP on average compared to 
the baseline SwiftNoC. The EDP in SwiftNoC increases with 
an increase in the number of SOTERIA enhanced MWMR 
waveguides. In addition to the increase in average packet 
latency, the increase in signal loss due to the higher number of 
reservation waveguides, double MRs for switching, and 
metadata detector MRs increases overall power, and thus EDP 
across these variants. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 9: (a) Normalized latency and (b) energy-delay product (EDP) comparison 
between SwiftNoC baseline and SwiftNoC with 2, 4, 8, and 12 SOTERIA 
enhanced MWMR data channels, for PARSEC benchmarks. Latency results are 
normalized to the baseline SwiftNoC results. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
We presented a novel security enhancement framework called 
SOTERIA that secures data during unicast and multicast 
communications in DWDM-based PNoC architectures from 
snooping attacks. The proposed SOTERIA framework shows 
interesting trade-offs between security, performance, and 
energy overheads for the Firefly, SwiftNoC, and LumiNoC 
PNoC architectures. Our analysis shows that SOTERIA enables 
hardware security in crossbar based PNoCs with minimal 
overheads of up to 14.2% (as low as 1.2%) in average latency 
and of up to 14.6% (as low as 1.3%) in EDP compared to the 
baseline insecure PNoCs. Thus, SOTERIA represents an 
attractive, low-overhead solution to enhance hardware security 
in emerging DWDM-based PNoCs. 
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